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The adoption by the u.s. Congress of protectionist trade legislation would 
invite retaliation and "torpedo" the Uruguay trade round, the European 
Community warns in a letter to U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter. 
The letter, written by Willy De Clercq, E.C. Commissioner for External 
Relations and Trade Policy, says the Community is concerned about a number 
of proposed trade measures that will be considered shortly by a House-
Senate conference. 
Mr. De Clercq notes that trade policy action "based on the assumption that 
the trade deficit is largely caused by perceived unfair foreign trade 
barriers addresses but a fraction of the real problem." The letter 
(attached) was also sent to members of the House-Senate conference. 
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I thought it would be useful if I were to sketch out the main 
points of concern to the European Community (EC) arising from 
the drafts of trade legislation shortly to be considered by 
the House-Senate Conference. This is not meant in any way to 
attempt to interfere with the domestic legislative process; we 
fully realise that decisions on the legislation of the United 
States are for the Congress and the President alone. However, 
we do have vital interests at stake in this legislation. 
Let me be more specific. First, the twelve nation EC is the 
United States' biggest trading partner, accounting for $53 
billion worth of US exports in 1986 (compared with $45 billion 
to Canada and $27 billion to Japan). Second, the EC - with 
20% of world trade - and the United States - with some 14% -
are the biggest actors on the world trading stage. Thus we 
both have a major responsibility for the preservation of the 
one world trading system set up under the auspices of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). We know that 
many have criticised the GATT. But the plain fact is that as 
the barriers to trade were reduced under the GATT world 
exports have risen, in volume terms, by a factor of seven, and 
United States' exports by a factor of five. This has meant 
the biggest increase in prosperity in the recorded history of 
the Western World. 
Any trade policy action based on the assumption that the trade 
deficit is largely caused by perceived unfair foreign trade 
barriers addresses but a fraction of the real problem and 
would be bound to lead to retaliation by other trading 
partners and to a major disruption of ~orld trade. If either 
of us, however well intentioned, were to seek to turn the clock 
back to the trade restrictions and bilateralism of the early 
1930s, the world would rapidly become a much poorer and more 
dangerous place; in particular, many of the five million 
Prows,onal address 
Rue de la Lo, 200 
Aa1~ .. ,,,.,..1 ... 
Telephone 
Dorect hne 235 25 30 
Te/u· 
COMEU B :?1877 
• • • I • • • 
Tetegraph,c adaress 
COMEUR Brussels 
-2-
American jobs now dependent on exports would be lost. 
The following matters are, in brief, the ones which concern 
the EC most: 
1. Unilateral action in defiance of internationally 
agreed rules, 
~-there-definition of what constitutes a 
countervailable subsidy: mandatory action under 
Section 301 and under provisions which would attempt to 
deal with trade surpluses on a sectoral or bilateral 
basis: the standing of petitioners in AD and CVD cases 
involving processed agricultural products: the 
mandatory imposition of an import surcharge; the 
provisions on diversionary input dumping: the private 
right of action in AD cases; and leases treated as 
sales. The various steel provisions which defy 
existing bilateral arrangements must also be 
mentioned in this context. 
2. Potential restrictions on foreign investment in the 
u. s., 
~- detailed, discriminatory disclosure and 
registration requirements contrary to OECD agreements. 
3. Sector-by-sector reciprocity requirements, 
~-, the provisions on telecommunications and 
maritime shipping. 
4. The creation of new non-tariff barriers, 
~- the provisions on the origin labelling of foreign 
foods and ingredients. 
5. New limitations on U.S. trade negotiating authority. 
6. New limitations on the President's discretion in trade 
cases. 
If provisions on these lines were to be enacted, we see 
two main consequences. 
The first would be that the current round of trade negotiations 
- the Uruguay Round - which the United States has done much to 
support, would effectively be torpedoed. Who would want to 
continue with a major negotiation to improve and expand the 
trading rules if a major Contracting Party declared its 
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intention not to abide by the existing ones? And who would 
wish to continue serious negotiations if the United States 
negotiators were hamstrung by limits on their authority to 
enter into trade agreements and could not ensure prompt 
consideration by Congress of the results? 
The second would be certain retaliation or the enactment of 
mirror legislation by others in some cases, encouraging 
existing European protectionist pressures which we have so far 
been able to contain. Would the United States welcome it if 
the EC were to insist on reciprocity on, say, wool textiles 
(where U.S. tariffs are substantially higher than ours) and 
threaten retaliation if no U.S. concessions were made? The 
result of such actions would be a major disruption of world 
trade and of the prosperity of all trading partners. 
This is only a thumbnail sketch of our concerns. I attach a 
more detailed description of the EC's main preoccupations and 
hope that the Administration and Congress will be able to take 
them into account as the work on the trade bill progresses. 
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ATTACHMENT 
The European Community is concerned about the following provisions 
in the trade bills: 
1. Unilateral action in defiance of international agreements 
to which the U.S. is a party 
A number of amendments to the U.S. trade laws would, if enacted, 
amount to a unilateral re-interpretation of internationally agreed 
rules. They would contravene obligations entered into by the U.S. in 
· previous rounds of negotiations. The Community would be faced with 
domestic pressures to take mirror action, to adopt mirror legislation, 
or to retaliate. It may be worth recalling in this context that in 
1980-85, when the U.S. dollar favoured U.S. exports to the EC, EC 
industry complaints against U.S. firms led to 21 findings of dumping, 
notably in the chemical and textile sector. 
Examples: 
• The import surcharge to finance the TAA program. 
• Section 301 and its variations: retaliation against trading 
partners who fail to eliminate so-called unfair practices 
without prior authorization of the CATT Contracting Parties. 
In such cases, the affected country would be entitled to 
suspend the application of concessions or obligations vis-a-vis 
the U.S. 
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• With respect to AD/CVD law: 
the definition of countervailable subsidies (rejection of 
the concept of "general availability" in favor of 
"specificity", introduction of concept of "commercial terms" 
for loans), 
the definition of "industry" and "like product" for 
processed agricultural products, and the calculation of a 
subsidy in such cases, 
amendment to the definition of the Foreign Market Value in 
AD cases involving related importers, 
expansion of the scope of the AD/CVD laws to cover dumping 
of input products, government imports and duty-free imports 
under the Florence Convention and to treat leases as sales, 
private right of action allowing plaintiffs in dumping cases 
to recover damages, 
cross-cumulation in AD/CVD injury determinations, 
• Provisional relief in escape clause cases prior to a finding of 
injury. 
• Denial of benefits of GATT Code on Government Procurement 
without prior GATT authorization. 
• Steel - unilateral changes in the coverage of the VRAs on steel 
and the origin rules pertaining to such VRAs. 
2. 
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• Expansion of the definition of "unfair practices" to cover 
export targeting, or activities of State-trading firms under 
Section 301. 
• Quota auctioning following relief under Section 201. 
• Section 337 (removal of injury provision makes the use of 
Section 337 even more objectionable). 
• Tariff reclassification - silicone, casein, steel plates. 
Potential restrictions on foreign investment in the U.S. 
Registration and disclosure requirements on foreign investors 
would be discriminatory, could oblige them to disclose business 
strategies and therefore deter foreign investments. The proposal would 
be contrary to OECD Agreements to which the U.S. is a party. Both the 
U.S. and the EC share an interest in discouraging discrimination against 
their firms in third markets. It would be an irony if the U.S. were to 
impose a surveillance on foreign investments while simultaneously 
seeking to open foreign markets to U.S. investments in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. 
3. Sector-by-Sector Reciprocity Requirements 
• Telecommunications: world trade is founded on each country 
finding an overall balance with its trading partners; like 
death and taxes, sectoral imbalances are an unavoidable fact of 
life. In any case, it is the EC who has a deficit with the 
u.s. in telecommunications. Should the EC retaliate? Should 
the U.S take restrictive action on the basis of this bill, the 
EC would counter-retaliate. Furthermore, any U.S. action on 
the basis of sectoral reciprocity could trigger or further 
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encourage demands by the EC for similar action in cases where 
U.S. barriers to trade would be higher than ours. Would the 
U.S. appreciate, for example, a European Wool Textiles 
Reciprocity bill? Allow us to recall that in June 1987 the EC 
Commission published a "green paper" on telecommunication 
services and equipment which recommends action in the EC to 
effectively enhance free competition and deregulation in this 
sector. 
• Maritime Shipping: The EC stands ready to co-operate with the 
U.S. in the face of unilateral restrictions by third countries. 
However, the U.S. should refrain from investigating foreign 
carriers without well-founded reasons to presume unfairness on 
the part of the carrier, and should not adopt measures that 
would lead to cargo reservation in violation of the objectives 
sought by both the U.S. and the EC. 
4. New non-tariff barriers 
• Origin labelling for foreign food ingredients: Food processors 
change their sources of supply, depending on availability and 
price. Origin labelling for ingredients would require constant 
changes in the labels. This is totally impractical. 
5. New limitations on U.S. trade negotiating authority 
The U.S. and the European Community have played a major role in 
launching the Uruguay Round. However, the credibility of the U.S. 
negotiators will be seriously hampered if they arc hamstrung in their 
ability to reach agreements both on tariff and non-tariff matters, and 
if they cannot ensure that the outcome of the negotiations will be 
considered promptly and without amendments by the legislative branch. 
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6. Presidential discretion in individual trade cases 
The existing international trading rules permit the U.S. to take 
restrictive action against imports under Article XIX (escape clause) or 
Article XXIII (unfair acts, for example) when this has been authorized 
by the Contracting Parties in cases where they consider it to be 
justified under GATT criteria. In Article XIX cases the affected 
country is entitled to suspend the application of concessions or 
obligations vis-a-vis ·the U.S. where it considers the action not to be 
justified. In Article XXIII cases action without authorization is 
GATT-illegal and the affected country would have a clear case for 
retaliatory action. 
The existing Section 301 provisions already permit the U.S. 
Administration - under national law - to violate these international 
rules. The trade bill's limits on the President's waiver authority 
might oblige the Administration to do so, particularly if the timetable 
for reaching an agreement is unrealistically shortened. 
